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            This is a rich paper, full of topics that interest me and could lead to digressions which I
would enjoy, but which lead away from the main points of the paper. I see two main points, first, that
the ethics of care is analogous to the principle of charity, and second, that both of these are not
justified solely by concern for others, but have prudential value. The analogies are interesting,  and
the argument for prudence is valuable.
            Both the ethics of care and the principle of charity emphasize relations, making
connections,  expanding  justified beliefs in the one case and expanding moral beings and
relationships on the other.
            Davies notes that care is accused of being other-directed - even leading to self-sacrifice.
Clearly one can raise a similar charge against the principle of charity.  After all, trying to find the
best rendering of a text by someone else actually helps that person.   And in a competitive situation
it harms me.  Davies correctly claims that I am helping myself as an epistemic agent.  The analogy
in the case of the ethics of care is somewhat less clear to me.  I certainly can agree, however, that
sensitivity to developing the standpoints of different moral subjects can give us a greater
appreciation of issues, types of moral characters, and moral dilemmas. So we can increase our
moral capacities in much the same way that we can increase our epistemic ones.  So I agree that
there are good self-regarding grounds for both charity and care.  I think that there can be good
other-regarding grounds for not adopting charity, and for using the justice mode of moral
reasoning.  When Socrates misinterprets the claim that justice is in the interests of the stronger,
suggesting that it is about muscle building and diet, he can be seen - I doubt that he must be seen -
as aiding Thrasymachus to speak clearly, unambiguously and to think more clearly.  In a similar
vein we can criticize our friends by showing them how their actions look from the viewpoint of
justice reasoning, not because we are unsympathetic to them, but because such reasoning can
bring them to a better awareness of how their choices can be reasonably interpreted by others and
how they can become better aware of their choices.  This is not to deny that in general both charity
and the ethics of care are on the side of connections.  It is simply to repeat the old theme that
context can determine how a method of reasoning is used. 
            I will conclude these very brief comments with some comments about reasoning concerning
decision making.  One of the cardinal tenets of rational decisions involving others is that the agent
should understand the utilities and the subjective probabilities of the others involved.  If we are to
read those observations charitably, they seem to have a great deal in common with both the
principle of charity and with the ethics of care as Davies describes it.  Being able to grasp what
other people value, what connections they make among the values, and what they think will happen
in the future - all these contribute to the kind of sensitivity to moral agents that she describes.  By
contrast, the argumentative modes, the uncharitable criticism of arguments, the argumentative
forms of justice reasoning seem to resemble what are called heuristics and stereotypical thinking
in the literature on decisions.  They have the advantage of speed and simplicity, but often go
wrong.    But examining that subject would take us in a very different direction from the present
paper.

